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We propose a model of evolutionary snowdrift game with N-person interactions and study the
effects of multi-person interactions on the emergence of cooperation. An exact N-th-order equation
for the equilibrium density of cooperators x∗ is derived for a well-mixed population using the ap-
proach of replicator dynamics. The results show that the extent of cooperation drops with increasing
cost-to-benefit ratio and the number N of interaction persons in a group, with x∗ ∼ 1/N for large
N . An algorithm for numerical simulations is constructed for the model. The simulation results are
in good agreements with theoretical results of the replicator dynamics.
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The theme of how cooperative behavior emerges among
competing entities has attracted the attention of physi-
cists, applied mathematicians, biologists, and social sci-
entists in recent years [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. There
are good reasons that physicists showed much interest
in this problem and have made contributions. The co-
operative behavior is similar to that in interacting spin
systems, and some important features, e.g., phase transi-
tions and universality which carry a heavy flavor of sta-
tistical physics, have also been observed in evolutionary
models of cooperation with spatial structures [9, 11]. In-
deed, applying ideas in physics across different disciplines
is a key characteristic of physics in the new millennium.
A powerful tool to study cooperative phenomena is the
theory of evolutionary games based on such basic models
as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [12, 13, 14] and the snow-
drift game (SG) [15, 16]. The basic PD is a two-person
game [17, 18], in which two players simultaneously choose
one of two possible strategies: to cooperate (C) or to de-
fect (D). If one plays C and the other plays D, the co-
operator pays a cost of S = −c and the defector receives
the highest payoff T = b (b > c > 0). If both play C,
each player receives a payoff of R = b − c > 0. If both
play D, the payoff is P = 0. Thus, the PD is character-
ized by the ordering T > R > P > S of the payoffs, with
2R > T + S. In a single encounter, defection is the bet-
ter action in a well-mixed or fully connected population,
regardless of the opponents’ decisions. Allowing for re-
peated encounters and evolution of characters could lead
to cooperative behavior [12]. Due to practical difficulties
in measuring the payoffs or even ranking the payoffs ac-
curately [19, 20], there are serious doubts on taking PD
to be the most suitable model for studying emerging co-
operative phenomena in a competing setting [21]. The
evolutionary snowdrift game (ESG) has been proposed
[21] as an alternative to PD and has attracted some re-
cent studies [6, 7, 8]. The basic snowdrift game (SG),
which is equivalent to the hawk-dove or chicken game
[15, 16], is again a two-person game. It is most conve-
niently described using the following scenario. Consider
two drivers hurrying home in opposite directions on a
road blocked by a snowdrift. Each driver has two possible
actions – to shovel the snowdrift (cooperate (C)) or not
to do anything (not-to-cooperate or “defect” (D)). If the
two drivers cooperate, they could be back home on time
and each will get a reward of b. Shovelling is a laborious
job with a total cost of c. Thus, each driver gets a net
reward of R = b−c/2. If both drivers take action D, they
both get stuck, and each gets a reward of P = 0. If only
one driver takes action C and shovels the snowdrift, then
both drivers can get through. The driver taking action
D (not to shovel) gets home without doing anything and
hence gets a payoff T = b, while the driver taking action
C gets a “sucker” payoff of S = b − c. The SG refers to
the case of b > c > 0, leading to T > R > S > P . Thus,
PD and SG only differ by the order of P and S in the
ranking of the payoffs. This seemingly minor difference
leads to significant changes in the cooperative behavior,
when evolution of characters is introduced. Following
replicator dynamics [14], there exists a stable state with
coexisting cooperators and defectors in SG for a well-
mixed population. More interestingly, it was found that
spatial structures tend to suppress the extent of coop-
eration in ESG [21], in contrast to the common belief
that spatial structure constitutes a favorable ingredient
for cooperation [22, 23].
Most models of evolutionary games proposed so far for
studying cooperative phenomena, including those with
competitions among a group of entities, involve only
two-person interactions. In reality, multi-person inter-
2actions are abundant, especially in biological and social
systems. A representative model is the so-called public
goods game (PGG) [24], for studying group interactions
in experimental economics. The PGG considers an inter-
acting group of N agents or players. Each player either
contributes a public good of value b at a cost c with
0 < c < b, or does nothing at no cost. With n coopera-
tors in the group, the total contributionsRnb are divided
evenly among all players in the group, where R (R < N)
is called the public good multiplier. Thus a coopera-
tor will get a benefit of Rnb/N − c, and a defector gets
Rnb/N without doing anything. Obviously, in a one-
shot PGG, defectors outperform cooperators, leading to
a Nash equilibrium where all players are defectors. For
N = 2, PGG reduces to PD and thus PGG represents a
N -person prisoner’s dilemma game.
Motivated by the recent works on ESG and PGG,
we propose and study a N -person interacting model of
SG. We refer to our model as the N -person evolutionary
snowdrift game (NESG). The key question is how coop-
eration is affected by allowing for N -person interactions.
The evolution of cooperative behavior in the NESG is
studied analytically within the framework of the replica-
tor dynamics [14]. For arbitrary interacting group size
N , an exact N -th-order equation for the equilibrium fre-
quency or fraction of cooperators x∗(r) is derived for a
well-mixed population, where r = c/b is a parameter that
characterizes the cost-to-benefit ratio in SG. The equa-
tion can be solved numerically for x∗ as a function of r
for any N . As the size of the interacting group increases,
cooperation in NESG decreases and x∗ ∼ 1/N for large
N . These results are checked against results obtained by
numerically simulating the evolutionary dynamics and
good agreements are found.
The N -person evolutionary snowdrift game is defined
as follows. Consider a system consisting of Nall agents.
In a N -person game, an agent competes with a group
of N − 1 other agents. Depending on the situation, the
interacting group of N agents can be chosen at random
among the Nall agents as in the case of a well-mixed
population or defined by an underlying geometry as in
the case of a regular lattice or other networks. There is a
task to be done and every agent will get a reward of b if
it is completed by one or more agents within the group.
The total cost of performing the task is c, which could be
shared among those who are willing to cooperate. The
payoff of an agent thus depends on (i) the character of
the agent and (ii) the characters of his N − 1 competing
agents. Here, we will focus on the case of a well-mixed
population.
For an agent of C-character, his payoff depends on the
number of C-character agents in the interacting group
including himself. The C-character agents are those who
are willing to share the labor in completing the task.
If the agent under consideration is the sole C-character
agent in the group, then his payoff is b − c. If there are
two C-character agents, then his payoff is b− c/2, and so
on. Thus, a C-character agent in a N -person snowdrift
game has a payoff of
PC(n) = b−
c
n
, for n ∈ [1, N ], (1)
where n is the number of C-character agents in the group
of N agents including the agent concerned.
For an agent of D-character, his payoff depends on
whether there is a C-character agent in the group. As
long as there is one, the task will be completed and the
D-character agent will get a payoff of b without doing any
work. When there is no C-character in the group, then
his payoff vanishes since the group has N D-character
agents and no one is willing to perform the task. Thus,
a D-character agent in a N -person snowdrift game has a
payoff of
PD(n) =
{
0 n = 0
b n ∈ [1, N − 1]
. (2)
As evolution proceeds in NESG, the numbers of
C-character and D-character agents become time-
dependent.
The model is original. It is different from the previ-
ous models in which the payoffs are typically evaluated
by summing up the payoffs of two-player games, for a
player competing with a number of other players. There
are many real-life situations where pairwise interactions
are inapplicable. We give two examples here where N -
person interactions are more appropriate. (i) In a public
construction project such as a bridge, a school or a road
that serves a small remote community, everyone in the
neighborhood will be benefited (b) and the cost (c) can
be shared by those who are willing to contribute. (ii) A
place such as a class room, a dormitory or a student com-
mon room needed to be cleaned regularly with a labor of
cost c, and every user will get a benefit b from the clean-
liness. Certainly, more realistic modelling will require
additional parameters, e.g., more incentives for carrying
out the task in the form of long term returns. Here, we
study the simplest version as the model can be treated
analytically and thus provides insight into the extent of
cooperation with a function of the parameters r and N
in the model.
The evolutionary behavior in NESG in a well-mixed
population is introduced through the replicator dynamics
[14]. The frequency of cooperation x(t) = NC(t)/Nall,
where NC(t) is the number of C-character agents in the
population at time t [6, 21]. The time evolution of x(t)
is governed by the following differential equation [14]
x˙ = x(fC − f¯), (3)
where fC(t) (f¯) is the instantaneous average fitness of a
C-character agent (the whole population). These quan-
tities are equivalent to the corresponding average payoffs
3in the case of strong coupling [25]. In the well-mixed
case, interacting groups of N agents are randomly cho-
sen. The fitness fC , which is in general time dependent,
is determined as follows according to the binomial sam-
pling [25]
fC =
N−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
xj(1− x)N−1−jPC(j + 1), (4)
which takes into account of the various combinations of
the characters of an agent’s N − 1 neighbors. The first
three factors in the sum give the probability of having (j+
1) C-character agents in the group ofN agents. Similarly,
the instantaneous average fitness fD(t) or the average
payoff of a D-character agent is given by
fD =
N−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
xj(1− x)N−1−jPD(j). (5)
These expressions amount to a mean field approach. In
Eq. (3), the dynamics of cooperation is that x(t) will
increase (decrease) if the fitness fC is greater (smaller)
than the instantaneous average fitness f¯(t) of the whole
population. The latter is defined by
f¯(t) = x(t)fC(t) + (1− x(t))fD(t). (6)
Substituting Eq.(6) into Eq.(3), the dynamics of x(t) is
governed by
x˙ = x(1− x)(fC − fD). (7)
Although it is possible to solve the time evolution of
x(t), we will instead focus on the steady state. After
the transient behavior, the system evolves into a steady
state, i.e., the Nash Equilibrium, in which x˙ = 0. It
follows from Eq. (7) that the steady state or equilibrium
frequency of cooperation x∗ satisfies
fC(x
∗) = fD(x
∗). (8)
Substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into Eqs. (4) and (5) gives
fC and fD in terms of N , b and c. Equation (8) for x
∗
can then be expressed as
N−1∑
j=1
1
j + 1
(
N − 1
j
)
(
x∗
1− x∗
)j =
b− c
c
. (9)
Using the identity
(1 + y)N =
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
yi, (10)
we have ∫ x
0
(1 + y)Ndy =
1
N + 1
(1 + y)N+1
∣∣∣∣
x
0
=
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
yi+1
i+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
x
0
, (11)
and thus the relation
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
xi+1
i+ 1
=
1
N + 1
[(1 + x)N+1 − 1]. (12)
Applying Eq.(12) to Eq.(9), we find
r(1 − x∗)N +Nx∗(1− x∗)N−1 − r = 0, (13)
which is an N -th-order equation for x∗(r,N) in the
steady state, where r = c/b. Note that the size of the
population NAll does not enter, as the analysis assumes
an infinite population following the mean field spirit.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The equilibrium frequency of cooper-
ation as a function of r = c/b, for N = 2, 3, 5, and 10 in a
well-mixed population. The analytic results (lines) obtained
by solving Eq. (13) and the simulation results (symbols) are
in good agreement. In simulations, we used Nall = 2000 and
105 time steps. Each data point is an average over 100 real-
izations.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) A log-log plot of the equilibrium fre-
quency of cooperation as a function of N for r = 0.2, 0.5, and
0.8 in a well-mixed population. The analytic results (lines)
from Eq. (13) and the simulation results (symbols) are in
good agreement. In simulations, we used Nall = 5000 and
107 time steps. Every data point is an average over 10 real-
izations. A dotted line of slope −1 is shown as a guide to the
eye.
Equation (13) can be solved exactly in closed form for
N ≤ 4. For N = 2, Eq. (13) recovers the result x∗ =
4b − c
b− c/2
of the standard two-person evolutionary SG in
a well-mixed population [6, 21]. For N ≥ 5, Eq.(13)
can be solved numerically for x∗(r,N). Figure 1 shows
the results (lines) of x∗(r) for N = 2, 3, 5, 10. We note
that x∗(r) decreases as r increases for arbitraryN , with a
more rapid drop as r increases for larger values ofN . This
indicates that the incentives for being a cooperator drops
as r and N increase, and agents tend to wait for someone
else to perform the task and enjoy a free ride. For a given
r, the dependence of x∗ on N is shown in Fig. 2 on a log-
log scale. The results (lines) show that x∗ decreases with
increasing N , with a power-law of exponent −1 for large
N . Analytically, the large N behavior can be extracted
by taking the small x∗ limit of Eq. (13). We find
x∗ =
2(1− r)
(N − 1)(2− r)
, (14)
from which x∗ ∼ 1/N for large N follows.
As a supplement and to verify the results using the
replicator dynamics, we also perform numerical simula-
tions on NESG. The algorithm goes as follows. An agent
in a total population of Nall agents can take on either
the C-character or D-character. The initial characters of
the agents are assigned randomly. At each time step, an
agent i is randomly chosen and a group of N − 1 other
agents are randomly chosen among the Nall−1 agents to
compete with i. Depending on the character of agent i,
his payoff Pi is evaluated according to Eq. (1) or Eq. (2).
Evolution of character of agent i is introduced by com-
paring the payoff with that of another agent j, which is
again randomly chosen. For the chosen agent j, he would
compete with a randomly chosen group of N − 1 agents
and his payoff is Pj . If Pi is less than Pj , the character
of the agent i will be replaced by that of agent j with
a probability (Pj − Pi)/b. If Pi ≥ Pj , the character of
agent i remains unchanged. The results from numerical
simulations (symbols in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) are in good
agreement with the analytic results based on the replica-
tor dynamics. The way of constructing a proper simula-
tion algorithm will also be useful in studying variations
of the model in which analytic approaches fail.
In summary, we have proposed and studied an evolu-
tionary snowdrift game with N -person interactions. We
derived an exact N -th-order equation for the equilibrium
frequency x∗(r,N) of cooperators in a well-mixed pop-
ulation using the approach of replicator dynamics. The
results show that the level of cooperation lowers as r
increases. For fixed r, x∗ drops with the number N of
interaction persons in a group and takes on x∗ ∼ 1/N for
large N . We also constructed a numerical algorithm to
simulate the model. Simulation data are in good agree-
ment with the analytic results of the replicator dynam-
ics. Further extension of NESG to include the effects of
spatial structures such as regular lattices and complex
networks will be interesting.
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